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Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception
Introduction
Today, with the rising costs of attorney's fees, the question of
who should bear the burden of those fees is likely to be a major issue
in every lawsuit, large or small. Each litigant would like to shift the
costs of his counsel to the other side if possible, but under the law in
the United States as it stands today, this generally cannot be done.
However, when a party has been subjected to oppressive tactics by
an opponent, justice requires that such party be allowed some measure
of compensation. This Note will explore one particular method of
compensating a party who is subjected to just such conduct: the
federal bad faith exception to the general rule against allowing the
recovery of attorney's fees. The first part will be a review of the law
governing allowance of fees in this country and in England. This
review will be followed by a discussion of the history and evolution
of the federal bad faith exception and an analysis of its major char-
acteristics. Judicial adoption of the exception by several states will
be catalogued. The Note next examines the statutes of three juris-
dictions that allow attorney's fees for bad faith. The statutes will
be compared with the federal rule. Finally, the law in California
regarding attorney's fees will be discussed along with reasons why
California should adopt the federal bad faith exception.
The General Rule and Its Exceptions
Although Alaska,1 Oregon, 2 and Washington 3 have statutes that
1. ALASKA B. Cry. P. 82. Rule 82(a) also provides a schedule of attorney's
fees that may be used in suits for damages, unless the court otherwise directs:
Non-
Contested Trial Contested
First 2,000 25% 20% 15%
Next 3,000 20% 15% 12.5%
Next 5,000 6 15% 12.5% 10%
Over 10,000 10% 7.5% 5%
If no recovery is had, the court may fix a reasonable amount as attorney's fees
for the prevailing party.
2. OR. REv. STAT. § 20.010 (1975) states "The measure and mode of compen-
sation of attorneys shall be left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties;
but there may be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment or decree certain
sums by way of indemnity for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or suit, or
defense thereto, which allowances are termed costs."
3. WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.84.010 (1976), the Washington statute, is similar to
the Oregon statute.
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allow an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in the discretion
of the court, most states and the federal courts follow the "American
rule."4  The rule states that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recover-
able as costs or damages in the absence of a statute authorizing the
award of fees or of an agreement between the parties providing for
them. " The United States Supreme Court first announced this rule
in Arcambel v. Wiseman in 17966 and has adhered to it up to modem
times.7  It has become a hard and fast rule of law and is as entrenched
as any in the American judicial system.
In England s the practice of awarding attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party in a lawsuit is an old one. As early as 1275, the law
courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to a success-
ful plaintiff,9 and since 1607, they have been able to award attorney's
fees to the prevailing defendant also.1° Today, after litigation of the
substantive claims, it is the practice in English courts to conduct a
hearing before special "taxing masters" to determine the appropriate-
ness and amount of such an award."
Some commentators have repeatedly advocated adoption of the
English rule in the United States.' 2  Others who prefer the American
4. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Campbell v. Maze,
339 So.2d 202 (Fla. App. 1976) affirming 307 So.2d 235; Strickland v. Williams, 234
Ga. 752, 218 S.E.2d 8 (1975); Salvador v. Popaa, 56 Haw. 111, 530 P.2d 7 (1975);
Kidwell & Heiser v. Fenley, 96 Idaho 534, 531 P.2d 1179 (1975); Frost v. Cedar
County Bd. of Supervisors, 163 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1968); Pelican Printing Co. v.
Pecot, 216 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1968); Harrison v. Textron, Inc., - Mass. -,
328 N.E. 2d 838 (1975); Bitney v. School Dist. No. 44, 167 Mont. 129, 535 P.2d
1273 (1975); Atlas v. Silvan, 128 N.J. Super. 2,7, 319 A.2d 758 (1974); Sorin v.
Board of Educ., 46 Ohio St. 2d 177, 347 N.E. 2d 527 (1976); Gaylord v. State ex.
rel. Dep't. of Highways, 540 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1975); Chatham Communications, Inc.
v. General Press Corp., 463 Pa. 292, 344 A.2d 837 (1975); Austin Paving Co. v.
Cimarron Constr., Inc., 511 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
5. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
6. 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
7. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
8. See 1962 PROCEEDING OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
A.B.A. Other countries also follow the English practice of awarding counsel fees to the
prevailing party.
9. Statute of Glouster, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1. This statute, which mentioned
only "the cost of his writ purchased," was from the beginning liberally construed to
include all costs of suit, including attorney's fees.
10. Statute of Westminster, 1606, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3.
11. Solicitor's Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27.
12. E.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Greenberger, The Cost
of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IOwA L. REV. 75
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Kuenzel].
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practice have generally argued that being forced to pay an opponent's
counsel fees is a form of penalty and that a litigant should not be
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit. They also
claim that the poor might be reluctant to bring lawsuits to vindicate
their rights if payment of their opponents' attorneys' fees might be
one of the penalties for losing.' 3 The burden on judicial administra-
tion that might be created by the "time, expense, and difficulties" in-
volved in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee is
also given as a reason for retaining the American rule. 14
Supporters of the English system have not refuted these argu-
ments but have instead stressed the evils of the current rule, including
the fact that under it the successful party is never fully compensated
because such party must pay counsel fees which may be as much or
more than the total recovery in the suit.15 They also point out that
the chance of recovering counsel fees from a losing opponent can
create a strong incentive for a lawyer to take on a meritorious case
without regard to the client's ability to pay. Such an incentive would
greatly increase the number of people, especially the poor, served by
the legal profession.' 6 Nevertheless, despite the clamor for change,
the courts and the legislatures in this country have generally refused
to adopt the English practice.' 7
Although the courts tend to adhere to the American rule, Congress
and many of the state legislatures have provided for attorney's fees
by statute when the policy behind the legislation is important enough
to encourage enforcement by private litigation.' 8 For example, in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Congress has expressly allowed
recovery of reasonable attorney's fees for abuse of the discovery
process.' 9
As with all general rules, the courts have used their equity powers
to fashion exceptions to the American practice when the interests of
13. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Sands, Attorneys' Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A.J. 510, 513 (1977).
14. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
15. Kuenzel, supra note 12, at 84.
16. Ehrenzweig, supra note 12, at 798.
17. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
18. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (antitrust); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970)
(public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) (equal employment); 42
U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (fair housing); CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1031(c) (West
Supp. 1976) (suit for wages); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3856, 3860 (West 1971 & Supp.
1977) (worker's compensation). See also The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp.
1977)) (Oct. 19, 1976).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (protective orders); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to
make discovery).
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justice have so required,20 and three major exceptions have been de-
veloped. The first of the exceptions to the American rule, which is
recognized both in the federal system and by the states, is the common
fund-substantial benefit exception. This exception applies when a
party, at his own expense, brings an action and creates or preserves
a fund in which others share. Even if no fund has been created, the
exception nonetheless applies if the plaintiff's litigation has conferred
a substantial benefit on an identifiable class.21  In the exercise of
equity jurisdiction, courts may award attorney's fees out of the fund
or require contribution by those on whom the benefit has been con-
ferred.22 This exception was one of the two specifically approved in
the Supreme Court's most recent decision on attorney's fees in the fed-
eral system, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society.23
A second generally recognized exception, which was not one of
those mentioned in Alyeska but which has ample support in the case
law,24 is the prior litigation exception. This exception comes into
play when a person is required, because of the wrongful act 25 of
another, to protect his interests by bringing or defending a lawsuit
against a third party. Under these circumstances, in a subsequent
20. Congress itself attempted with the Fee-bill of 1853 to provide a sort of
"general exception" to the American rule for federal courts. The bill, embodied in
28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923 (1970), allows nominal sums (e.g., $20 for trial or final
hearing; $5 for motion for judgment), called attorney's and proctor's docket fees, to
be taxed and recovered as costs. Even though this statute may have been an at-
tempt over 125 years ago to provide for a general attorney's fee statute in derogation
of the American rule, it is obviously of no consequence today in the face of counsel
fees that run into thousands of dollars. Furthermore, the bill has been held not to
interfere with the general equity power of the federal courts to develop more sub-
stantial exceptions. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
257-58 (1975).
21. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Alford v. Citizens &
S. Nat'l Bank, 237 Ga. 194, 226 S.E.2d 905 (1976); Cassidy v. Lehnhausen, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 1049, 324 N.E.2d 236 (1975); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Inc. v. Club 167,
Inc., - Minn. __, 232 N.W.2d 103 (1975); Gettings v. City of Elgin, 16 Or. App. 140,
517 P.2d 686 (1974); Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wash. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974).
22. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536 (1881).
23. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
24. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 325 So.2d
29 (Fla. App. 1976); Uyemura v. Wick, - Haw. _, 551 P.2d 171 (1976); In re State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 50 Mich. App. 71, 212 N.W.2d 821 (1973); Johnson v. Mercantile
Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 510 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1974); Donnelly v. Young, 471 S.W.2d
888 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1971); Manning v. Loidhamer, 13 Wash. App. 766, 538 P.2d
136 (1975). Federal courts apply the prior litigation exception in diversity suits. See
Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
25. E.g., as where defendant's breach of contract causes plaintiff to breach its
contract with a third party, or where defendant's tortious conduct causes damage for
which plaintiff is held responsible. 1 S. SPEisan, ATroREys' FEEs, § 13:4 (1973).
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action against the person whose wrongful act caused the prior litiga-
tion, the party wronged may recover as damages reasonable attorney's
fees expended in the prior suit.
20
The third judicially created exception to the American rule is
the federal bad faith exception, which is also sometimes called the
exception for unreasonably obdurate behavior.2 7  This exception is
the second one approved in Alyeska. The Supreme Court stressed,
however, that Congress had not given the federal judiciary any "roving
authority . . . to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever
the courts might deem them warranted"2 8 and limited the exceptions
allowed in the federal system to the bad faith exception and the
common fund-substantial benefit exception.2 9
The Federal Bad Faith Exception
The power to award attorney's fees for bad faith conduct on the
part of a litigant originated in the English Court of Chancery around
the 11th century. Some commentators have claimed that the power
derived from 17 Richard II, c. 6 (1393), which provided that the
Chancellor could award damages, in his discretion, against persons
who brought vexatious and baseless suits in chancery.30  Others have
argued that the power was inherent in the equity courts and did not
derive from a statute or any delegated authority.31 Whatever the
power's source, examination of the old general Orders of the Court
shows that the equity courts exercised wide discretion in this area.3 2
A review of the English cases shows that attorney's fees were not
even then allowed as a matter of course. Chancery only allowed them
if the particular facts warranted. The cases fell generally into three
categories: (1) where charges of fraud were made but not proved,
(2) where the main ground of the suit was vexatious, wanton, or op-
pressive, and (3) where a fiduciary relation existed and the fiduciary
was put to expense in defending an unfounded suit or in administering
the trust property.
33
26. E.g., Uyemura v. Wick, - Haw. _ _ 551 P.2d 171, 176 (1976).
27. E.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
28. 421 U.S. at 260. The court viewed the Fee-bill of 1853 as governing the al-
lowance of attorney's fees in the federal courts. See note 20 supra. As noted 'pre-
viously, however, this statute is, in effect, a reiteration of the American rule in view
of its ineffectiveness as a real provision for attorneys fees. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1923
(1970) with Ax.sA R. Crv. P. 82. See note 1 supra.
29. 421 U.S. at 257-59.
30. Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917).
31. Id.
32. Andrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch. D. 133 (1888).
33. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928).
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The United States courts of equity at the time of their creation
by the Judiciary Act of 178934 were given the power possessed by the
English chancery courts at the time of the adoption of the United
States Constitution. 35  Because the courts of equity in England exer-
cised discretionary power to award attorney's fees against a party for
bad faith conduct at that time, these same powers were assumed by
the federal equity courts upon their creation. Among these equitable
powers is the exercise of the court's conscience to deter frivolous liti-
gation, to punish a party for abuse of the judicial system, and to avoid
injustice to innocent litigants. Because these goals represent the
purpose of the federal bad faith exception, 36 providing for such a
remedy as attorney's fees is well within a court's equity powers.
3 7
The early federal cases that developed the exception into its
present form restricted its application solely to suits in equity.38  Be-
cause the distinction between law and equity in the federal system
was abolished by the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1938,39 federal courts have expanded the application of the
exception and have not limited it to equity proceedings alone.
40
The bad faith exception allows a court in the exercise of its equity
powers to award attorney's fees to a party when his opponent has
acted in bad faith - in a vexatious or wanton manner or for oppressive
reasons.41  If a court finds that a litigant has engaged in such conduct,
it may award that portion of the opponent's fees incurred as a result
of such conduct. 42  If the bad faith pervades the whole suit, the
guilty party may be adjudged liable for all of the opponent's fees.
43
The bad faith exception embraces two types of conduct. The
basis for the award may be either in bad faith which induces the
litigation or in that which occurs during litigation. 44
34. Act of Sept. 27, 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
35. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 Haw.) 369, 384 (1854).
36. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
37. See notes 30-35 & accompanying text supra.
38. See, e.g., Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.
1928) (fraud); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (de-
rivative suit).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
40. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (admiralty); Siegel v.
William E. Bookhultz & Sons, Inc., 419 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (breach of in-
surance contract).
41. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
42. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers Local No. 107, 68
F.R.D. 318, 322 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
43. See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
44. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). The term "litigation" will be used in
this Note to mean the period beginning the moment the complaint is filed to final
judgment after appeal.
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The first basis for an award of attorney's fees involves situations
in which a party has without justification refused to recognize the
clear legal rights of another, thereby forcing that person to bring a
lawsuit to enforce his rights.45  The principal application in the past
of this type of bad faith has been in suits brought to vindicate consti-
tutional rights or in suits brought for violation of the civil rights acts.
46
The scope of the exception is now broader; the exception is applicable
any time a defendant has behaved obstinately and has induced another
to file a lawsuit against him.
47
The following three cases illustrate what constitutes bad faith
inducing litigation. A standard for determining whether an award is
warranted was set out by the Southern District of New York in Lewis
v. Texaco, Inc.48  In that case,49 thirty-two seamen agreed to serve
on the defendant's vessel, which was to make a coastal voyage from
Florida to several Gulf ports and the west coast. The ship, however,
did not complete the trip, which ended after only sixteen days. The
seamen were discharged and paid wages for the sixteen day period.
The controversy arose out of the seamens' claim for one month's
wages pursuant to section 594 of Title 46 of the United States Code. 0
Section 594 provides that if a seaman is discharged without fault
before one month's wages are earned, he is entitled to receive from
the ship owner, as compensation, one month's pay in addition to any
wages actually earned. Texaco refused to pay the claimed compensa-
tion contending that the seamen had waived their rights by signing
a release.
45. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974). The first type of
bad faith differs from the prior litigation exception in that under the former, the plain-
tiff is forced to bring a suit against a party who has shown bad faith, while under
the prior litigation exception, no bad faith is involved. The party seeking attorney's
fees under the prior litigation exception incurred them in another suit with a third
party, which suit was caused by the wrongful act of the party from whom fees are
sought.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970). The application of the bad faith excep-
tion to suits brought under the Civil Rights Acts will not be so important as it was
in the past. Recently, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp.
1977)) which permits the court, in its discretion, to allow attorney's fees to successful
parties in civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986, under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in suits brought by the United States
to enforce a violation of the Internal Revenue Code, with the proviso that the United
States as a party may not recover costs.
47. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 945 (1972); United States v. Texas, 495 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. 418 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
49. The facts of the case are set out in Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 527 F.2d 921 (2d
Cir. 1975).
50. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1970).
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The seamen brought suit to recover the amounts they thought
were due them under the statute. The lower court found in their
favor and awarded them one month's salary along with counsel fees.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on the merits. It held Tex-
aco's refusal to pay unjustified and unsupportable, finding the law "so
broad and the solicitude for seamen so plain" that Texaco's conten-
tions as to any claimed releases could not be sustained. 5' The court
was unsure of the basis upon which the lower court had placed its
award of attorney fees, so it remanded the case to the district court
for reconsideration of the issue.
On remand, the district court awarded fees under the exception,
finding that Texaco was fully aware of its obligations to pay the seamen
and that its refusal "was sheer recalcitrance on its part and an act of
bad faith."52  Thus, by its unjustified refusal to pay the compensation
due knowing it had a duty to do so, Texaco had induced the plaintiffs
to file suit to vindicate their rights.
Another case in which attorney's fees were awarded for bad faith
conduct that induced litigation was Bell v. School Board.53  There,
the parents of children attending county schools brought an action to
force the board to desegregate the count), educational system. The
award of attorney's fees was based on the board's long continued pat-
tern of "evasion and obstruction" of desegregated education long after
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.54  The court found not
only that the board refused to take any initiative to desegregate but
that it hindered any attempts on the part of the plaintiffs to do so, thus
forcing them to bring suit to vindicate their rights. 55
51. 527 F.2d at 924.
52. 418 F. Supp. at 28.
53. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
54. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
55. 321 F.2d at 500. Although the matter did not arise in Bell, whether an
award of attorney's fees against a state agency will be allowed is today an unsettled
question. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), held that a suit in federal court
by private parties seeking recovery payable from a state treasury is barred by the
eleventh amendment which prohibits the states from being sued in federal court
without their consent. Id. at 663. Subsequently, it was decided in the Sixth Circuit
that a federal court does not have the power to award attorney's fees payable out of
a state treasury against a state or its officers acting in their official capacities. Jordon
v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1974). However, the Fourth Circuit in
Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975), refused to read Edelman so restric-
tively and awarded fees against officials. The court cited Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the Fifth Circuit concluded, before Edelman was de-
cided, that "the award of attorney's fees is not an award of damages against the State,
even though funds for payment of the costs may come from the state [treasury]."
Id. at 302. The Third Circuit, reaching the same result as the Sixth Circuit, inter-
preted Edelman as "closing the door on any money award from a state treasury in any
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Finally, Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad56 contained yet
another example of conduct that induced litigation in such a manner
so as to warrant an award of fees against the defendant. In that case,
a labor union was sued by some of its members for racial discrimina-
tion. The court noted that the defendant union was a powerful or-
ganization as contrasted with the insular impotency of the plaintiff
members. Moreover, the union had a duty to protect the plaintiffs'
rights and had instead subjected them to arbitrary, oppressive, and
discriminatory conduct. Under these circumstances, the court deemed
it "fair" for the union to bear the cost of the plaintiffs' attorney's fees.
57
Although the first type of bad faith involves conduct on the part
of a defendant before suit is filed, the second type involves conduct
on the part of either party during the litigation itself. Under this
part of the exception, attorney's fees may be awarded against plaintiffs
for bad faith in instituting a groundless suit and against defendants
for asserting a baseless defense. An award can also be made against
any party for offering unnecessary petitions and motions or for gen-
erally pursuing a course of vexatious conduct that pervades the whole
suit.
Several cases have explicitly defined the type of conduct that
warrants an award of counsel fees for bad faith during litigation. The
Eighth Circuit in one of the early bad faith cases, Guardian Trust Co.
v. Kansas City Southern Railway,58 held the plaintiff accountable for
attorney's fees for filing a groundless lawsuit. The court made the
award to the defendant Trust Company because it had been brought
into court and compelled to defend against charges of fraud that were
baseless."9 Such a result, reasoned the court, was compelled by the
application of equitable principles. 60
category." Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974). Despite
this split among the circuits, a federal court can, in a suit against a state or one of
its agencies or officials, award attorney's fees against defendants in their individual
capacities for bad faith if it is found that they personally engaged in the conduct
justifying the award. Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources,
380 F. Supp. 1153, 1159-60 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (relying on provisions of state law).
Sovereign immunity also protects the federal government agencies and officers
acting in their official capacities from fee shifting without their consent. Harrisburg
Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 893, 899 (M.D.
Pa. 1974).
56. 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
57. Id. at 481.
58. 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928).
59. Id. at 246.
60. Id. It should be noted at this point that the defendant in such a bad faith
suit would also have a cause of action for malicious prosecution if he could show that
the plaintiff instituted suit without probable cause and was actuated by malice. Ber-
tero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184
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An award is also justified under this second type whenever a
defendant obstinately and unjustifiably poses a baseless defense, there-
by forcing the plaintiff to participate in a long, unnecessary trial to
prove the defendant's liability. An example of this type of bad faith
was seen in Gates v. Collier,61 in which inmates of a state penitentiary
brought a class action against Mississippi officials, alleging that the
operation and conditions of the prison violated their constitutional
rights. From the commencement of the suit, the defendants had
strongly denied all constitutional violations. They had adhered to this
position unreasonably throughout several long evidentiary hearings in
the face of evidence of their clear liability. Their obstinancy in refus-
ing to admit culpability had caused plaintiff's attorney to expend time
and money engaging in extensive discovery, interviewing witnesses,
and making trips to the penitentiary which he otherwise would not
have done. Only when the defendants had seen that it was futile
to maintain their groundless defense did they agree to submit the case
on a stipulated record.62  The Gates court further found that the law
in the area of prisoner's rights was sufficiently clear and settled so
that it was completely unnecessary for the action to have even been
brought. Although the court could have based an award against the
defendants solely on their bad faith in inducing litigation, it also found
bad faith in the defendants' groundlessly prolonging the litigation.
6 3
Bad faith conduct sufficient to justify attorney's fee awards has
also been found when either party during litigation offered unneces-
sary; groundless, vexatious, or oppressive petitions and motions.
6 4
In Baas v. Elliot,"5 a teacher brought an action against a college in
state court to review the college's denial of tenure and its termination
of the teacher's employment. The college removed the case to federal
court alleging that because there was a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the college and the plaintiff's union, subject matter
jurisdiction existed under the Labor Management Relations Act."
The college then reversed its position and filed an answer, claiming
(1974); Hudson v. Zumwalt, 64 Cal. App. 2d 866, 872, 149 P.2d 457, 460 (1944).
Attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation would be important elements of damages
in such a case. Under the bad faith exception, however, if the only damage suffered
by the defendant was the expense of suit (no injury to his business or reputation, for
example), then a separate action for malicious prosecution would be unnecessary be-
cause the expenses could be recovered in the original suit filed in bad faith.
61. 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
62. Id. at 343.
63. Id. at 344.
64. Local No. 149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212, 214-15
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962).
65. 71 F.R.D. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
claimed violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The district court found that the college engaged in such conduct
for the sole purpose of receiving the dismissal it could not otherwise
obtain in state court. The court said that "[s]uch a frivolous, self-
defeating invocation of federal procedure cannot be countenanced."
6 7
It found the college's actions unacceptable, awarded attorney's fees
for bad faith to the plaintiff, and remanded the case to the state court.68
Finally, fees are allowed when a party pursues a vexatious course
of conduct throughout the litigation. In Red School House, Inc. v.
Office of Economic Opportunity,9 plaintiffs had brought suit charging
the OEO with wrongfully cancelling a grant of funds. The district
court, applying the bad faith exception, had allowed plaintiffs attor-
ney's fees because of the obdurate and uncooperative conduct of the
OEO during the course of the lawsuit and because of its defiant at-
titude. The court decided the attorney's fees issue in a separate pro-
ceeding. In explaining the rationale for its decision it quoted from
the opinion on the merits:
[The OEO's conduct] constituted the most amazing and unaccept-
able conduct of an agency of the United States that the Court has
observed. On occasion, OEO refused to produce witnesses as
ordered by the Court, it failed to produce documents as ordered
by the Court after representing that it would do so, it resisted all
reasonable efforts toward reconciling its differences with the plain-
tiffs, and certain OEO officials even refused to appear before the
Court to attempt to justify such behavior. This conduct, in many
circumstances, bordered on the contumacious.T
Fees were also allowed in First National Bank v. Dunham.71
In that case, the reprehensible conduct consisted of the defendant's
attempts to conceal assets, to make fraudulent conveyances, to per-
suade a witness to give misleading testimony, to bribe a handwriting
expert, and to falsify certain records for trial.7
2
The foregoing cases illustrate that under the federal bad faith
exception an award of attorney's fees is appropriate whenever a party
clearly violates the law and in the face of this clear violation obsti-
nately forces the plaintiff to expend time and effort preparing or
conducting a lawsuit. Additionally, grounds for an award exist if
a plaintiff brings a groundless suit, a defendant asserts a baseless de-
fense, a party poses unnecessary petitions and motions, or a litigant
67. 71 F.R.D. at 694.
68. Id.
69. 386 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1974).
70. Id. at 1193.
71. 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 713.
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generally pursues a course of conduct that is vexatious or oppressive
to his opponent.
Safeguards and Guidelines for Applying the Exception
Objections to the federal bad faith exception have been made.
If it is abused, the exception could operate to deny a party his right
to use the judicial system. It could also operate to deny a party due
process by penalizing him if he fails to recover in a suit he brings or
if he loses a suit he defends. This denial of a right could occur if
the exception is too readily applied, and if the judge, once the jury
has found for the plaintiff, forgets that the case raised a very valid
issue in the beginning and grants attorney's fees for a defendant's
obstinate refusal to concede liability. The exception could also be
abused by a plaintiff who makes unreasonable demands for settlement
and threatens to seek obstinancy fees if the defendant does not ac-
quiesce. 3  Finally, another argument against the exception is that
it lacks standards and guidelines by which to measure bad faith.74
These criticisms may have merit, but they can be met, by stressing
that the federal decisions do provide guidelines in cases in which the
federal courts said that the exception should never be mechanically
applied. When it is applied, the trial courts should scrupulously
adhere to standards and guidelines developed in the many cases.75
The standards that provide guidance are first that attorney's fees for
bad faith conduct should never be imposed if there is a genuine dispute
in a case concerning either the law or the facts. Vigorous litigation
in an area in which the law is unsettled should never be held to be
in bad faith.7 6  Applying the bad faith exception when there is a
genuine dispute would not be consonant with the right in a free
society to use the legal process nor with the main purpose of courts -
to settle disputes. For example, if there is a genuine controversy as
to the facts or the law, mere refusal to settle should never be considered
obstinancy 77 There must be more. There must be no genuine fac-
tual dispute, the law on the subject must be clear, and the right of
the plaintiff must be certain. 8
73. Such conduct on the part of a plaintiff would justfy an award of fees against
him.
74. See note 132 & accompanying text infra.
75. See notes 48-72 & accompanying text supra.
76. Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975).
77. Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975).
78. The objection can be made that under such standards the bad faith exception
would apply even to the plaintiff in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), who brought an action for negligence even though
she was contributorily negligent and even though she knew that in California con-
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Second, to hold a plaintiff liable for the attorney's fees of the
defendant just because he failed to prove his case would also be an
abuse of the bad faith exception. 79  If there is nothing in the record
to show that a plaintiff's suit was not a bona fide effort to seek redress
or if there is nothing to indicate that it was brought to harass, em-
barrass, or abuse the defendant, an award of attorney's fees would be
improper.80
Third, the standard for judging bad faith conduct involving pre-
trial motions or motions during trial is also very high. Petitions,
motions, and evidentiary objections based on a valid legal foundation
are always proper.
Thus, the standards for an award of attorney's fees under the bad
faith exception are stringent, and asserting valid claims, advancing
serious defenses, and litigating contested facts should never be found
to be bad faith.8 ' As the district court said in Tenants and Owners
in Opposition to Redevelopment v. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development: "Vigorous advocacy involves con-
flict and is a natural and expected by-product of litigation in our judi-
cial system. It is only conduct that clearly goes beyond generally
accepted vigor and persistence commonly employed in our adversary
system that may be considered in determining whether sanctions should
be imposed."
8 2
The exception is used only as a remedy for abuse and unnecessary
effort and delay caused by bad faith and obstinancy. Instances of
abuse of the exception will be rare, and its misapplication can be re-
duced to a minimum if judges and litigants make sure the developed
standards are carefully applied.
tributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery. The
bad faith exception, however, does not apply to such situations. It only applies when
the law is clear and, to borrow a phrase from the ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (§ 7-102(A)(2) (1975)), when the party against whom it operates can-
not make a good faith argument for change. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
plaintiff in Li was guilty of bad faith conduct in filing suit where the law on the
subject was over one hundred years old, the trend in other jurisdictions was to do
away with contributory negligence as a complete defense, and where a good faith
argument for a change in the law could be and was made. It is only in such cases
as Monroe v. Board of Com'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
945 (1972) and Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976), where a party
maintains a position in opposition to settled principles of law that have either recently
been adopted or reaffirmed by the highest courts of the jurisdiction does the bad
faith exception for holding to an unreasonable legal position come into play.
79. Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d at 170.
80. Blackburn v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 60 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
81. Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782, 800 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
82. 406 F. Supp. 960, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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Attorney's Fees for Bad Faith in Other Jurisdictions
Most states have not adopted the federal bad faith exception,
preferring only to recognize the prior litigation and common fund-
substantial benefit exceptions. A few jurisdictions, however, most not-
ably Washington, D.C.,s3 Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Indiana,
either have recognized the exception 4 or have considered it favorably
in dicta.
85
Instead of adopting the federal bad faith exception in its entirety
some state legislatures have embraced the basic theory behind the ex-
ception and have provided remedies for bad faith litigation by stat-
ute. The scope of most of these statutes is limited, and they provide
for attorney's fees for bad faith only in certain situations arising dur-
ing litigation.86 Only Puerto Rico,87 North Dakota,88 Illinois, 9 and
Georgia"° have statutes that are similar to the federal exception in
providing for a general award of fees for bad faith conduct.
Rule 44.4(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico provides that "[W]here a party has been ob-
stinate, the court shall in its judgment impose on such person the
payment of a sum for attorney's fees." 91 The Puerto Rico courts award
attorney's fees under this statute for the purpose of avoiding "court
congestion, needless litigation and the delay of the redress of indi-
vidual rights."92  Another goal of the statute is to ensure that the
rights of the poor are protected against abuse by more economically
advantaged and powerful litigants.9-  If the court finds a party to be
83. Because the District of Columbia is under federal control, it is not certain
whether this is really an independent adoption of the exception.
84. See 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass'n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
F.W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310 A.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Lynham, 293 A.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Saint Joseph's College v. Mor-
rison, Inc., 158 Ind. 272, 302 N.E.2d 865 (1973).
85. Theodore D. Bross Line Constr. Corp. v. Ryan Crane Serv. Corp., 32 Conn.
Supp. 181, 345 A.2d 594 (Super Ct. 1975) (dictum); Feist v. Luzerne County Bd.
of Assessment Appeals, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 181, 347 A.2d 772 (1975).
86. See MicH. G.C.R. 526.7(2) which is substantially the same as FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(g).
87. Although Puerto Rico is a U.S. possession, its law on attorney's fees will be
considered on the same basis as that of the states. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, § 44.4(d)
(App. II 1969).
88. The North Dakota statute is nearly identical to the Illinois statute. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-26-31 (Supp. 1974).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404 (1965).
91. 32 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, R. 44.4(d) (App. II 1969).
92. De Thomas v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 335, 346 (D.P.R. 1973).
93. Id.
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obstinate within the meaning of the statute, the court is bound to
impose the prescribed sanctions.
94
Conduct within the statute's definition of obstinancy includes hold-
ing to a meritless position, either with respect to a particular issue or
throughout the entire case.95 In De Thomas v. Delta Steamship Lines,
Inc.,96 the United States District Court, applying the Puerto Rico
statute, held a steamship company responsible for payment of its op-
ponent's attorney's fees because it was obstinate in refusing to admit
liability in the face of conclusive evidence of its culpability and because
it sought a motion to dismiss on a theory that had been discarded by
an earlier Supreme Court case. The court also based the award on
the company's persistence in alleging that damages were not recover-
able for conscious pain and suffering when Puerto Rico law was clearly
to the contrary.
97
City Bank of Honolulu v. Rivera Davila" cites other examples
of conduct held to constitute obstinancy within the meaning of the
statute. Such conduct includes prolonging a trial by interjecting ir-
relevancies, refusing to admit facts that are proved to be true beyond
all doubt, and making statements and later contradicting them.99
The Illinois statute is quite different from that of Puerto Rico. It
attempts to regulate the bad faith conduct of litigants at the beginning
of the lawsuit in the pleadings stage. Section 41 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act'00 provides that a party making false pleadings will have
to pay reasonable attorney's fees and the expenses the other party in-
curred because of the false pleadings. This statute is remedial and
it prevents litigants from being subjected to harassment by lawsuits
that are based on false statements and brought without legal or factual
foundation. 101
The Illinois Court of Appeal applied section 41 in Elston-Damen
Currency Exchange Inc. v. Sheon,1o2 in which the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed on the basis of res judicata. The court found that the plain-
tiff had had a trial on the merits which had finally determined the
issues, that it had not properly attacked the judgment on direct appeal,
94. Montafia v. Metro. Const. Corp., 87 P.R.R. 35 (1962).
95. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Ramos, 357 F.2d 341, 342 (1st Cir.
1966).
96. 58 F.R.D. 335 (D.P.R. 1973).
97. Id. at 345.
98. 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971).
99. Id. at 1371.
100. ILL. ANat. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
101. Grandys v. Spring Soft Water Conditioning Co., 101 Ill. App. 2d 225, 242
N.E.2d 454 (1968).
102. 46 Ill. App. 2d 218, 197 N.E.2d 143 (1964).
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and that it had filed the instant case when it knew that the matter
could not be relitigated. The court assumed that such conduct on
the part of the plaintiff had subjected the defendant to harassment and
expense which warranted compensating him for his attorney's fees.
10 3
Georgia's bad faith attorney's fees statute' 0 4 makes attorney's fees
available only to plaintiffs. Fees may be awarded if a defendant has
acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.105 The statute's scope is
further limited in that it has been construed to apply only to the de-
fendant's bad faith conduct which induces litigation. 0 The other
two conditions for invocation of the statute, stubborn litigiousness and
unnecessary trouble and expense, have been similarly limited to con-
duct which causes the plaintiff to file an action. Therefore, as inter-
preted, the statute does not apply to either party's conduct during
litigation.
The restrictive application of the Georgia statute is illustrated in
Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. v. Sheftall.10 7  The
defendant built a house for the plaintiff in which water leaks were
discovered. The plaintiff quickly notified the defendant of the defect.
Despite repeated assurances that the leak would be repaired, the de-
fendant failed for over a year to remedy the situation. As a result,
the leak caused considerable damage to the house. The court de-
termined that the defendant was under a duty to make the repairs
and that his breach of this duty caused plaintiff unnecessary trouble
and expense within the meaning of the attorney's fees statute. 0 8
Although these statutes are based upon the concept that there
should be a remedy for bad faith litigation, none of them reaches all
of the instances of bad faith conduct included within the proscription
of the federal bad faith exception. These statutes are very limited
in the help they provide courts in controlling abuse of the legal system
and in protecting innocent litigants. The Puerto Rico statute as in-
terpreted applies only to bad faith conduct during litigation. No
cases have been found that have applied it to situations in which the
defendant's bad faith conduct induces a party to seek redress in the
courts. The Illinois statute is limited to penalizing litigants for alleg-
103. Id. at 227, 197 N.E.2d at 147.
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404 (1965): "The expenses of litigation are not gen-
erally allowed as a part of the damages; but if the defendant has acted in bad faith,
or has been stubbornly litigous, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and
expense, the jury may allow them."
105. Altamaha Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 395, 224
S.E.2d 76, 78 (1976).
106. Adams v. Cowart, 224 Ga. 210, 215, 160 S.E.2d 805, 809 (1968).
107. 97 Ga. App. 398, 103 S.E.2d 143 (1958).
108. Id. at 405, 103 S.E.2d at 149.
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ing untrue matter or alleging matter in bad faith in their pleadings. 10 9
Like the Puerto Rico statute, it does not apply to bad faith conduct
which induces litigation, to obstinancy in holding to a baseless defense,
nor to other major abuses of the judicial system.
Finally, the Georgia statute applies only to defendant's conduct
inducing litigation. It has no application to a plaintiff or defendant
who conducts a lawsuit in bad faith by instituting a vexatious suit,
by holding to a baseless defense, or by harassing and demoralizing his
or her opponent with a plethora of petitions and motions.
Therefore, from an examination of these three statutes and the
authorities of other states, the conclusion is warranted that no juris-
diction has a provision comparable to the federal bad faith exeception.
No other jurisdiction has a statute or judicially created rule providing
a vehicle by which the courts can remedy the effects of bad faith
litigation, prevent abuse of one party by the other, and stop general
misuse of the judicial system by awarding attorney's fees against those
who unnecessarily prolong litigation, harass their opponents and use
any means to prevail.
Attorney's Fees for Bad Faith in California
California's general rule as to attorney's fees is embodied in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021. It provides that "[e]xcept as attor-
ney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and
mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties ....,"11o Thus, Califor-
nia has codified the general American rule. The California appellate
courts have also judicially recognized"' the common fund-substantial
benefit" 2 and prior litigation exceptions."
3
The federal bad faith exception has had a long history of accept-
ance in dicta in California cases. Beginning in 1870 with Williams
109. In Brokaw Hosp. v. Circuit Ct. of McLean County, 52 IMI. 2d 182, 287
N.E.2d 472 (1972), the court applied the Illinois statute to allegations and denials
made in a pre-trial motion to dismiss.
110. CAL. Conm Crv. Puoc. § 1021 (West 1955).
111. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 states that the only exceptions
to the general rule are those provided by statute, the courts have not recognized this
as a limit on their equity powers to fashion exceptions when justice requires. See
D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1974), where the court speaks of "equitable nonstatutory" principles upon which
to base an award of fees. Id. at 25-26, 520 P.2d at 28, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
112. Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 13 P.2d 467, 72 Cal. Rptr.
146 (1968).
113. Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 381 P.2d 645, 30
Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963).
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v. MacDougall,1" 4 the California Supreme Court has recognized that
attorney's fees might be awarded if a party's conduct has been
"contumacious.",,15
Recently, the California courts have had several occasions to con-
sider whether the federal bad faith exception should be recognized
in California. In Russell v. Carleson,11 plaintiffs challenged the con-
stitutionality of California Welfare and Institutions Code section
11351.5,11- which requires an adult male living with a welfare family
to pay his own living expenses. In seeking an award of attorney's
fees, the plaintiffs charged the defendants with defending their actions
pursuant to the section although they had full knowledge of its in-
validity. The third district court of appeal found the statute to be
constitutional, and as a consequence the plaintiffs' request for attor-
ney's fees was found to be without merit."s However, in dictum the
court added that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of
the defendants and no findings of bad faith. Therefore, subsequent
to Russell it was arguable that if faced with a proper case on its facts,
the third district might have applied the federal bad faith exception.
In 1974 the Supreme Court of California had the opportunity
in D'Ainico v. Board of Medical Examiners"9 to review the law in
California with regard to attorney's fees. The court, in an opinion by
Justice Sullivan, cited Code of Civil Procedure section 1021120 for the
general rule and reaffirmed the existence of the judicially created
common fund-substantial benefit exception,12 1 although that exception
did not apply to the facts of the case. The court then observed that
any other basis for awarding attorney's fees would require recognition
of a new equitable nonstatutory principle.12 2  The court addressed
the plaintiff's argument that the defendants' conduct during the litiga-
tion had been "indefensible" and therefore justified an award of at-
torney's fees for the plaintiffs under the federal bad faith exception.
The supreme court, in declining to reach the plaintiff's argument to
award fees on the basis of bad faith, stated:
Thus, even assuming that a California court in a case of this nature
may in its discretion award attorney's fees to one party as a sanc-
tion for vexatious and oppressive conduct on the part of another
party or its counsel (a matter which we are not required to, and
114. 39 Cal. 80 (1870).
115. Id. at 85.
116. 36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497 (3d Dist. 1973).
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351.5 (West 1972).
118. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
119. 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
120. CAL. CODE CYV. PROC. § 1021 (West 1955).
121. 11 Cal. 3d at 25, 520 P.2d at 27-28, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
122. Id. at 25-26, 520 P.2d at 28, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
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do not, decide today), it appears that the trial court did exercise
its discretion on that basis and did determine that a prior monetary
sanction was sufficient .... 123
After D'Amico was decided, Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner 24 came down from the second district. In that case a
newspaper reporter brought a suit for indemnity against his employer
and sought attorney's fees in that suit under the bad faith exception.
To support his claim, the plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court in
D'Amico "hinted" that the power to award fees for bad faith conduct
existed in California courts but that the court required a proper fact
situation before deciding whether to include the federal equitable ex-
ception in California law.12 5  This court also avoided the issue, saying
that even though the California Supreme Court may on a proper day
and in a proper case decide to adopt the federal bad faith exception,
it had not yet done so and that this occasion presented neither the case
nor the day for adoption of the federal equitable rule. 126
Young v. Redman and Rejection of the Exception
The combination of favorable dicta'12 7 and the California Supreme
Court's evasion of the issue 12 8 left matters in an uncertain state until
the second district court of appeal finally squarely faced the issue
in Young v. Redman.12 9  Young had entered into a contract to sell
land to Redman. Later, Redman sought to rescind on grounds of
mistake and misrepresentation. Young sued for breach of contract,
and Redman cross-complained for fraud. The lower court, in finding
for Young, awarded him one thousand dollars in attorney's fees as
sanctions because of Redman's failure to appear when subpoenaed,
because of his completely unmeritorious cross-complaints and defenses,
and because of his vexatious and oppressive conduct in maintaining,
in bad faith, unfounded defenses and cross-actions. 30
The Redman court in deciding whether the lower court had prop-
erly awarded fees as sanctions first stated that there was no clear
authority in California for awarding attorney's fees under the rationale
of the federal bad faith exception because there existed no statutory
123. Id. at 27, 520 P.2d at 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The lower court had awarded
$750 for attorney's fees as discovery sanctions. Id. at 10, 520 P.2d at 17, 112 Cal.
Rptr. at 793.
124. 50 Cal. App. 3d 449, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683 (2d Dist. 1975).
125. Id. at 468-69, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
126. Id. at 469, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
127. Russell v. Carleson, 36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497 (3d Dist. 1973).
128. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1974).
129. 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86 (2d Dist. 1976).
130. Id. at 830, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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provision and all reference to it had been dicta. The court then
discussed the merits of such a rule, noting that such fee-shifting could
help deter bad faith litigation, reduce "the burning up of valuable
court time in handling frivolous, 'bad faith' matters devoid of merit
and make whole litigants who were forced to expend money on legal
fees to meet such unfounded positions."'
31
Despite its assessment that the exception would be a boon to
litigants who become victims of bad faith conduct and to the admin-
istration of the California courts, the second district refused to adopt
it. The court reasoned that such a rule would expand the power of
the lower courts and that such expansion was the responsibility of the
legislature. The court cautioned that such a power in the lower courts
without appropriate safeguards and guidelines could lead to abuse
and to a proliferation of appeals.
132
After discussing all of the reasons why it would not adopt the
federal bad faith exception, the Redman court, at the very end of
the opinion, changed its reasons for disallowing the one thousand
dollar sanction. Noting that "Code of Civil Procedure section 1021
provides that attorney fees are 'left to the agreement, express or im-
plied, of the parties' except as specifically provided by statute,"133 the
court found section 1992 of the Code of Civil Procedure13 4 to be just
such a statute. Section 1992 provided for sanctions of one hundred
dollars when a witness failed to appear when subpoenaed. The court
held that this statute covered the fact situation before it because Red-
man had failed to appear when subpoenaed. It therefore remanded
the case to the trial court to reconsider the question of sanctions in
accordance with section 1992.
From this holding, the conclusion can be drawn that the court
considered the bad faith exception unnecessary because there existed
an applicable statute. A strong argument can be made that this last
part of the Redman opinion transforms the court's whole discussion
of the bad faith exception into dicta. However, because the court
went to such lengths to repudiate the exception, a rebuttal of its rea-
sons for rejection and a discussion of why the exception should be
adopted in California is needed.
Adoption of the Bad Faith Exception in California
The court's reasons in Young v. Redman for refusing to adopt the
federal bad faith exception are without legal foundation. First, it
131. Id. at 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
132. Id. at 838-39, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
133. Id. at 839, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
134. CAL. CODE Crv. Paoc. § 1992 (West 1955).
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would be unnecessary for the legislature to act to create such a power
in California's lower courts. The power to award attorney's fees for
bad faith conduct is a power the superior courts of California already
possess because it is a power inherent in a court of equity. They have
the same equity powers as the courts of the federal system in that
they both possess full equity jurisdiction. 3 '
Such equitable power is apparent in the fact that the appellate
courts of California have fashioned another exception to the general
rule, the common fund-substantial benefit exception. 136  Furthermore,
in adopting this rule, the California courts followed federal precedent.
The common fund aspect of this exception was first recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Trustees v. Greenough, 37 and in
1895 the California Supreme Court followed suit in Fox v. Hale &
Norcross Silver Mining Co.138 Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank' 39
extended the exception in federal cases to allow for attorney's fees if
a substantial benefit was bestowed on nonparties, and this case was
cited as authority when California adopted this part of the exception
in Fletcher v. A.I. Industries, Inc.1
40
Second, the court's perception of a need for guidelines and safe-
guards from the legislature is not a valid reason to reject the exception
and deny the court's power to apply it if circumstances warrant. The
exception has been a viable part of the law in the federal system for
years.' 4 ' Its standards have been carefully developed and applied
in numerous cases.'14 2  A superior court choosing to exercise its in-
herent equitable powers in a given situation would have no trouble
finding guidance in the myriad of federal cases applying the exception.
Also, the task of exercising discretion in determining whether the
sanction is warranted is an appropriate one for the courts. It is a
role the courts currently play under certain California statutes that
allow attorney's fees for bad faith. 43  The only difference would be
that under the federal bad faith exception the courts would be apply-
ing a judicially created rule in the exercise of their equity powers -
135. Olcese v. Justice's Ct., 156 Cal. 82, 85, 103 P. 317, 318 (1909). Municipal
courts and justice courts have equity jurisdiction in only certain specified situations.
See CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 86 (West Supp. 1977). Any extension of the exception
to these latter courts would have to be done by statute or judicial construction of
their already existing equity powers.
136. See note 112 & accompanying text supra.
137. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
138. 108 Cal. 475, 41 P. 328 (1895).
139. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
140. 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1st Dist. 1968).
141. See notes 30-35 & accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 48-73 & accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 144-47 & accompanying text infra.
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a rule designed to apply to all facets of the judicial process and not
just to particular situations.
Finally, while a proliferation of appeals might be troublesome
initially, the burden on the appellate courts would be a temporary
one. As the courts become familiar with the case law developed in
the federal system and the case law which would develop in Cali-
fornia's appellate courts, the need for appellate review would decrease.
After recognizing that they have the power to adopt the federal
bad faith exception under their equity powers, the California courts
should choose to exercise their powers in this instance for several
compelling reasons. First, existing provisions allowing attorney's
fees for bad faith do not provide adequate protection against such
litigation and the consequent abuse of the judicial system. Recently
enacted Government Code section 800144 authorizes the recovery of
attorney's fees in an action to review an administrative proceeding if a
public entity has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 396b 14  allows an award if suit was filed in a court
without venue, if the choice of venue was not made in good faith, or
if proper venue was challenged in bad faith. The summary judgment
statute14 6 also has a provision for bad faith fees as do the various
California discovery statutes.14 7
These existing provisions allowing awards against bad faith con-
duct in specific situations do not provide the courts with enough power
in controlling the conduct of those who invoke their jurisdiction. No
statute or rule of judicial decision presently gives the lower courts the
power to discourage wholly unfounded and vexatious actions and
defenses. Government Code section 800148 applies only to the bad
faith conduct of officials and administrative bodies. It does not apply
to the individual who, aware of his clear liability, stubbornly refuses
144. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1977). The pertinent parts of the
statute read: "In any civil action to appeal or review the award, finding, or other de-
termination of any administrative proceeding . . . where it is shown that the award,
finding, or other determination of such proceeding was the result of arbitrary or ca-
pricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof in his official
capacity, the complainant if he prevails in the civil action may collect reasonable at-
torney's fees, but not to exceed . . . ($1,500), where he is personally obligated to
pay such fees, from such public entity .... "
145. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 396b (West Supp. 1977). The attorney is specif-
ically held responsible for fees under this statute. In Metzger v. Silverman, 62 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 30, 133 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1976), the court construed the good faith
mentioned in the statute as "that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom
from intention to defraud, and . . . being faithful to one's duty or obligation." Id.
at 38, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
146. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 437c (West Supp. 1977).
147. CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. §§ 2019, 2034 (West Supp. 1977).
148. CAL. GOV'T CODE: § 800 (West Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 29
to conciliate and forces his opponent to seek redress in the courts.
Section 396b, 149 allowing a motion for change of venue, along with
the discovery provisions and the summary judgment statute, encompass
only four of the many motions'5" that may be used under California
law to inundate a party and to drive up his costs in order to force him
into an unfair settlement. The federal bad faith exception applies
to all bad faith conduct occurring any time prior to filing, if that con-
duct induces the litigation, and to bad faith conduct occurring during
litigation. Therefore, the federal exception covers situations for which
sanctions are appropriate even though the conduct does not come
totally within the purview of the aforementioned statutes.15'
The second significant reason for adopting the bad faith exception
in California is that it would help to rid California's trial courts of bad
faith litigation while compensating the parties subjected to the abuse.
Awards for engaging in contumacious conduct, bringing vexatious suits,
and maintaining baseless defenses, would help deter such abuses of
the judicial process. Also, the practice of using petitions and motions
to harass the other party or to increase his costs by unduly protracting
the litigation would be deterred. 52  Such a sanction would cause all
parties to weigh carefully their contemplated motions and conduct and
impress upon litigants the fact that bad faith litigation costs money -
money they will have to pay.
Under the exception, however, all facets of the adversary system
as ideally envisioned would be preserved. Only those suspect prac-
tices developed to harass an opponent would be deterred by a system
of awarding attorney's fees against those who engage in proscribed
conduct. 53 Only calculated and purposeful abuse would be discour-
149. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. § 396b (West Supp. 1977).
150. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 418.10 (West 1973) (motion to quash
summons; motion to stay or dismiss for inconvenient forum); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 430.10 (West Supp. 1977) (special demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
lack of capacity; another action pending; misjoinder of parties; no cause of action
stated; uncertain pleading; no written contract pleaded); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 453
(West 1973) (amendments to pleadings, motion for continuance); CAL. CODE Cv.
PRoc. § 581 (West 1976) (motion to dismiss).
151. By its adoption of these few statutes providing for "bad faith" fees, arguably
the legislature has recognized the need for sanctions against vexatious litigation.
152. A situation warranting an award to the plaintiff occurs, for example, if each
time a plaintiff refuses in good faith to settle, the defendant files a motion to dismiss,
citing authorities and presenting arguments raised in previous motions in the same
suit or in similar suits.
153. Although the focus of this Note is the responsibility of parties for attorney's
fees for engaging in bad faith conduct, a related issue is the culpability of the party's
lawyer who engages in bad faith conduct. Probably more often than not, the attorney
is the one who engages in or encourages a party to engage in bad faith conduct.
Although no case has been found where attorney's fees for bad faith conduct were
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aged; a culpable party would be charged with the excess costs in-
curred because of bad faith or with the other party's entire costs of
counsel if such conduct pervades the whole lawsuit.
Finally, adoption of the exception would foster efficiency in the
judicial system. As recognized in Redman, the power to award fees
specifically awarded against the offending party's lawyer, because of the equitable
nature of the exception, there should be no impediment to such a practice. In fact,
if bad faith conduct were the result of the machinations of a party's lawyer, equity
might require that the offending attorney pay the bad faith fees. If a party were
adjudged liable for his opponent's fees because of the contumacious conduct of his
lawyer, a cause of action for malpractice would conceivably lie.
Vigorous advocacy on behalf of a client is expected of a lawyer. Canon 7 of
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law. An argument could be made that such
penalties as provided by the bad faith exception might discourage the lawyer from
carrying out his ethical duty to represent his client zealously. Canon 7 requires that
this zealous pursuit be conducted within the bounds of the law, and conduct falling
within the federal bad faith exception is not "within the bounds of the law." Further-
more, the disciplinary rules promulgated with Canon 7 subject a lawyer who violates
his obligation to the courts by engaging in bad faith conduct to professional disci-
pline. Thus, a lawyer may cooperate with opposing counsel when to do so would
not prejudice the rights of his client. He must further avoid the use of offensive
tactics during litigation. ABA CODE: OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIILTrrY, CANON 7,
DR 7-101(A) (1) (1976). More specifically, a lawyer is subject to professional dis-
cipline if he files a suit, asserts a position, conducts a defense, delays a trial, or takes
other action on behalf of his client which he knows or should know would harass or
injure another. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(1). An attorney must also not advance a claim
or defense that he knows is unwarranted under existing law and which cannot be sup-
ported by a good faith argument for the law's extension, modification, or reversal.
Id. at DR 7-102(A)(2). Further, discipline is in order if the lawyer counsels or
assists his client in fraudulent conduct, conceals evidence, or makes false statements.
Id. at DR 7-102(A)(3),(5),(7). The Code also prohibits an attorney from alluding
to any matter during trial that he has no reasonable grounds to believe is relevant
to the case or supported by admissible evidence, and from asking questions which
are intended to degrade a witness or another person when he has no reasonable basis
for believing they are relevant to the case. Id. at DR 7-106(C)(1),(2).
Because these disciplinary rules provide for sanctions against attorneys who en-
gage in bad faith conduct, the argument could be made that the bad faith exception
is unnecessary. However, the Code is not a sufficient safeguard to deter bad faith
litigation in view of the infrequency with which the rules are invoked to discipline
attorneys. Out of over 45,000 lawyers in California in 1976, only 97 were disciplined.
Compiled from STATE BAR OF CAr.. REP. Jan.-Dec. 1976. The bad faith exception
under which parties and possibly even attorneys are held liable for fees serves to deter
bad faith litigation more effectively than the Code because of the immediate and
pecuniary nature of the penalty. Also, the Code restricts the attorney's behavior, not
the client's. If a client realized that he would be liable for the other side's fees, this
potential liability could act as a deterrent to the client. Moreover, if the exception
were not adopted, the innocent party harmed by such bad faith conduct would be
left without compensation. In short, adoption of the exception would provide the
courts with a more effective way to deter bad faith conduct of both attorneys and
clients while providing justice to innocent parties.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
for bad faith litigation would serve to reduce the number of civil suits
filed. The reduction would occur because the possibility of having
to pay the attorney's fees of the opponents, in addition to their own,
would cause plaintiffs to think twice before filing lawsuits that should
not be filed and cause defendants to think twice before defending
actions that should not be defended.
Even if such suits were filed, the incidents of settlement may also
increase because under the exception there may be liability for pur-
suing vexatious suits and maintaining baseless defenses. Those liti-
gants reaching the trial court level would be encouraged to minimize
their opponents' expenses by foregoing unnecessary motions and evi-
dentiary battles. Thus, valuable court time could be conserved for
more pressing matters.
Although every person has a right to use the judicial process to
settle his disputes, no one has a right to abuse the judicial system even
in the name of vigorous adversary litigation. Although our judicial
system must encourage the just claim and the just defense, it need not
do so by countenancing abuse and inefficiency. The wise employment
of the bad faith exception by California's trial courts will help control
the conduct of litigants, deter frivolous bad faith litigation, compensate
parties subjected to abuse, and streamline the judicial system. There-
fore, the many reasons for adoption of the exception, the fact that
the California courts have the power to adopt the exception, and the
fact that the appellate courts have followed federal law in adopting
another exception to the American rule mandate the judicial adoption
of the federal exception in California.
Conclusion
The federal courts have developed the bad faith exception to the
general American rule disallowing attorney's fees. This federal bad
faith exception has not been widely followed by the states. Illinois,
Puerto Rico, and Georgia have statutes that are similar to the exception
and are based on the same policy considerations that lie behind it,
but none is as broad in scope as the federal rule. California has a
history of acceptance of the exception in dicta, but recently the Second
District Court of Appeal in Young v. Redman refused to adopt the
federal rule, preferring instead to leave this task to the legislature.
Legislative action, however, is unnecessary because the superior courts
of California, as courts of general jurisdiction, have the inherent powers
of courts of equity to apply the exception and in their discretion allow
attorney's fees for bad faith. If this power were exercised, any guide-
lines and safeguards needed for application could be found in the
already numerous federal cases interpreting the rule. Moreover, the
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federal bad faith exception should be recognized in California to pro-
mote the interests of fairness and judicial economy, to prevent needless
lawsuits, to encourage conciliation, and to promote the proper use of
the judicial system.
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